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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BALANCING PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY: LESSONS FROM
DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FOR COVID-19 VACCINATION
TRACKING EFFORTS
CARMEL SHACHAR*
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has brough the tension between individual
privacy and public health initiative to the fore, in part because many of the
solutions to the challenges of the pandemic proposed are digital. The first year
of the pandemic has revealed that the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act is both too restrictive of traditional public health activities
but also underprotective of important categories of health data. The failure of
digital contact tracing applications to make a difference in combatting the
pandemic during its early stages also illustrates the tension between individual
privacy and public health surveillance. In order to harness the power of digital
health to combat COVID-19 and other public health crises, we must resolve this
tension through building trust in digital public health and modernizing our
health data privacy regulation.

* Carmel Shachar, J.D., M.P.H., Executive Director, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy,
Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School.
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There is an inherent tension between individual privacy and public health
initiatives. Public health initiatives often benefit from access to detailed,
comprehensive information on individuals, especially when it comes to
combating infectious disease pandemics. On the other hand, individuals may
have serious and valid objections to their data being used by these initiatives and
concerns as to whether the data will be repurposed for other less noble causes
after the objectives of the initiative have been achieved. The COVID-19
pandemic has brought that tension to the fore, especially since many of the
solutions proposed are digital ones that rely on large amounts of information.
This paper will first explore the longstanding tension between individual
privacy and public health interests found in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). It will then consider how the tension between
privacy and public health undermined the use of digital contact tracing
applications to address the COVID-19 pandemic. It will then consider the
implementation of COVID-19 vaccine verification trackers as the next conflict
between privacy and public health likely to flare. Lastly, the paper will suggest
lessons to be learned from the unsuccessful implementation of digital contact
tracing apps that could contribute to a better outcome for COVID-19 vaccine
verification trackers.
I. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF HIPAA
In the United States, medical data is largely governed by HIPAA, although
some state statues such as the California Privacy Act (“CCPA”) also can apply.
Unfortunately, even pre-pandemic, HIPAA was considered outdated and
increasingly ineffective at protecting data privacy within a modern, digital
society. 1 The critiques of HIPAA most relevant to an infectious disease
pandemic can perhaps be categorized into two buckets: 1) HIPAA is onerous to
comply with, creating a chilling effect on public health research and
surveillance; and 2) HIPAA is significantly limited in scope, focusing almost
exclusively on electronic health records and ignoring the larger universe of
health data.
HIPAA does include an exception for public health, 2 allowing covered
entities to disclose protected health information (“PHI”) to public health
authorities legally authorized to receive such information, even without consent.
Specifically, a covered entity:
[M]ay disclose PHI to a public health authority that is authorized by law to
collect or receive such information for the purpose of preventing or controlling
1. I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, HIPAA and Protecting Health Information in the
21st Century, 320 JAMA 231, 232 (2018).
2. Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy and Novel Coronavirus, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/february-2020-hipaa-and-novel-corona
virus.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5VH-QT9Z].
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disease, injury, or disability, including, but not limited to, reporting of disease,
injury, vital events such as birth or death, and the conduct of public health
surveillance, public health investigations, and public health interventions; or, at
the direction of a public health authority, to an official of a foreign government
agency that is acting in collaboration with a public health authority. 3

There are of course, limitations to this exception. Most notably, the
disclosure must be given to a public health authority, defined as a federal, state,
tribal, or local agency responsible for the public’s health under an official
mandate. 4 This excludes health systems, nonprofits, and other nongovernmental entities seeking to address public health concerns. Likewise, this
definition suggests that other governmental agencies that are not officially
mandated to be responsible for the public’s health would not be able to receive
this information under this exception.
Furthermore, this exception is permissive, not mandatory: covered entities
are permitted to make such disclosures to public health authorities but are not
required to do so. 5 Health care providers may be reluctant to disclose useful data
to public health authorities since much of this PHI reveals sensitive information
regarding health status or lifestyle, such as insights into sexual orientation, drug
use and needle sharing, or mental health status.
As a result, it is unsurprising that HIPAA is perceived as a barrier to public
health activities and research. 6 In a 2007 survey of epidemiologists, 67.8% of
respondents reported that HIPAA had significantly made research more
difficult, including adding costs and time to study completion. 7 This is hardly
shocking because if public health experts cannot get access to data via the
HIPAA public health exception—perhaps because they are not partnered with
governmental authorities or because local providers are reluctant to share data
and cannot be compelled to do so—then they must go the onerous route of
obtaining informed consent for their activities. Even more concerning perhaps
is that these respondents also felt that HIPAA had a greater negative influence
on human subjects’ protection than a positive impact, with only one quarter of
respondents reporting that HIPAA enhanced privacy/confidentiality for public
health research subjects. 8 This suggests that we are perhaps not gaining
significant protections while imposing some challenging requirements for
conducting public health research. While public health research is distinct from

3. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(i) (2016).
4. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2013).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2016).
6. Andrea Wilson, Missing the Mark: The Public Health Exception to the HIPAA Privacy
Rule and Its Impact on Surveillance Activity, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131, 155 (2009).
7. Roberta B. Ness, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on Health Research, 298 JAMA
2164, 2164 (2007).
8. Id. at 2166.
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public health activities, it is likely that HIPAA has a similar impact on those
initiatives as well.
If HIPAA is too restrictive on traditional public health activities, it is also
significantly under-protective of important categories of health data at the same
time. HIPAA was written at a time before the digital revolution, in a world presmart phones and apps.
Correspondingly, its authors focused almost exclusively on PHI found
within electronic health records (“EHRs”). Health data that is not handled by
health care providers or entered into an EHR is considered “outside of HIPAA.” 9
Unfortunately, this means that some very personal information is left largely
unregulated and unprotected. For example, a research team was able to create an
algorithm that uses Instagram social media posts to diagnose depression as a
higher success rate than (human) general practitioners. 10 Target famously used
data analytics to identify which consumers are pregnant based on their past
shopping history, sometimes even before the individuals themselves knew of
their pregnancies. 11 Because of HIPAA’s focus on traditional medical providers,
its blind spots often benefit non-traditional participants in health and wellness,
such as technology companies. The limits of HIPAA may be problematic
because they can cause individuals to feel cynical regarding data privacy. If
Target or Amazon is already using my data to flag if I am pregnant or sick, then
do I have any real privacy protections? The more data is used in ways that serve
companies and not individuals, the more individuals may worry that any
information put out there will be fair game for usages they do not support or
agree with. Furthermore, the uneven distribution of privacy regulations can
become pertinent during an infectious disease pandemic because of the
heightened incentives for new players to develop health related solutions to
control or mitigate outbreaks. When companies, not longstanding hospital
systems or public health institutions, lead the development of pandemic digital
solutions, does that erode trust in these solutions for consumers?
II. LEARNING FROM THE CONTACT TRACING EXPERIENCE
Digital contact tracing, sometimes also called exposure notification, is a
logical response to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. Manual contact
tracing can quickly be overwhelmed by the large number of individuals to
process in an infectious disease pandemic that spreads quickly through a given
population. Although many states, such as Maryland, Massachusetts, and New
9. Cohen & Mello, supra note 1, at 231.
10. Andrew G. Reece & Christopher M. Danforth, Instagram Photos Reveal Predictive
Markers of Depression, 6 EPJ DATA SCI. 1, 1 (2017).
11. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/546WCQC9].
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York, rapidly scaled up their manual tracing programs, 12 this increase in
capacity is likely still not sufficient to meet demand. 13 Digital contact tracing,
however, can easily scale with a rapidly growing pandemic. Another benefit that
digital contact tracing has over manual contact tracing is that notifications can
happen almost instantaneously from when the index case is reported, i.e., the
digital contact tracing system almost immediately notifies those who may have
been exposed. 14 By delivering notice to those possibly exposed and infected
faster, the digital contact tracing system can potentially reduce infections by
encouraging those individuals to quarantine earlier. Lastly, manual contact
tracing relies on individuals knowing the names and information of those they
came into contact with during their period of infectiousness. This can lead to
overlooking proximity to strangers, such as riding in an elevator or waiting in
line for coffee together. Digital contact tracing does not have this limitation
because it relies on proximity of phones and smart devices rather than human
knowledge. Of course, the optimal system may combine digital contact tracing
with follow up manual contact tracing to gain a better sense of the scenarios that
result in disease spread or to connect those infected to social and medical
services. 15 But it is clear that digital contact tracing can be a powerful tool in
combating COVID-19 and other infectious diseases.
Despite its promises, digital contact tracing has remained relatively
underutilized in the United States and other countries. 16 Digital contact tracing
apps are only really effective when a significant percentage of the population
has downloaded and used them. Iceland has the highest adoption rate of any
country that does not mandate digital contact tracing apps, with forty percent of
the population using them. 17 In Europe, the adoption rates ranged from around
twenty percent in Germany to seven percent in Italy to three percent in France. 18
These low rates of adoption translate into very few instances of possible
transmission being caught. For example, in France, with its minimal adoption
12. Katherine Faulders et al., States Race to Start Coronavirus Contact Tracing, a
Monumental Task Ahead, ABC NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 3:02 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US
/states-race-start-coronavirus-contact-tracing-monumental-task/story?id=70285156 [https://perma
.cc/EUJ2-ZEX3]; Christie Aschwanden, Contact Tracing, a Key Way to Slow COVID-19, Is Badly
Underused by the U.S., SCI. AM. (July 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/con
tact-tracing-a-key-way-to-slow-covid-19-is-badly-underused-by-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/2L3L3QSR].
13. Luca Ferretti et al., Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 Transmission Suggests Epidemic Control
with Digital Contact Tracing, 368 SCIENCE 1, 2 (2020).
14. Id. at 1.
15. Louise C. Ivers & Daniel J. Weitzner, Can Digital Contact Tracing Make Up for Lost
Time?, 5 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e417, e418 (2020).
16. Mitch Leslie, COVID-19 Fight Enlists Digital Technology: Contact Tracing Apps, 6
ENGINEERING (BEIJING) 1064, 1066 (2020).
17. Id. at 1065.
18. Id.
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rate, the national contact tracing app caught only fourteen cases of possible
transmission. 19 The low rates of adoption can be exacerbated in the United
States, where there is no national leadership on this issue and funding for a
federal tracing and testing program was cut from COVID-19 relief bills. 20
Instead, states and municipalities are creating their own digital contact tracing
apps, which may or may not communicate with each other. In areas that cross
state borders, such as the tri-state area including New York City but also the
New Jersey and Connecticut suburbs, this can result in a patchwork of different
apps that are unable to adequately flag potential transmission events. This is
dismaying because best estimates suggest that to be truly effective, eighty
percent of smartphone users or fifty-six percent of the general population of a
country must download and use a digital contact tracing app. 21
III. WHY DID DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING FAIL?
We must ask ourselves: knowing the value of digital contact tracing to
combat a deadly pandemic with no yet known treatments, why did this
technology have such little impact? A significant factor is likely the tension
between individual privacy and public health surveillance. This tension was
expressed in two ways: 1) by designing apps to maximize privacy, potentially at
the cost of effectiveness; and 2) by the reluctance of consumers to adopt these
apps, even when maximized for privacy.
Digital contact tracing apps have been designed on a privacy preserving
spectrum. On one hand, some countries such as China explicitly link individual
identities to their COVID-19 risk, limiting movement of certain people based on
whether they may be at risk for the disease, and Israel and South Korea have
chosen to use cell phone geolocation data to digital contact trace their
populations without any of sort of opt-out. 22 Most countries, however, have
balked at such Orwellian oversight and attempted to enshrine privacy
protections directly into the architecture of their apps. Norway discontinued use
of its digital contact tracing app after it was critiqued by the Norwegian Data
Protection Authority. 23 Many have based their apps on a joint Apple/Google
platform that utilizes Bluetooth technology to avoid identifying individuals or
tracking their locations but still is able to identify when two people have spent
19. Id.
20. Aschwanden, supra note 12.
21. Patrick H. O’Neill, No, Coronavirus Apps Don’t Need 60% Adoption to be Effective, MIT
TECH. REV. (June 5, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/05/1002775/covid-appseffective-at-less-than-60-percent-download/ [https://perma.cc/H6CM-WTGL].
22. Michelle M. Mello & C. Jason Wang, Ethics and Governance for Digital Disease
Surveillance, 368 SCIENCE 951, 952 (2020).
23. Reuters Staff, Norway to Halt COVID-19 Track and Trace App on Data Protection
Concerns, REUTERS (June 15, 2020, 5:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-corona
virus-norway-apps-idUSKBN23M18T [https://perma.cc/6DQC-T365].
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enough time in proximity to transmit the virus. In fact, both Ireland and Germany
switched from building their own digital contact tracing app to using the
Apple/Google technology because of the strong privacy protections offered by
the Apple/Google approach. 24 Most American states are also using this platform.
It is possible, however, that some effectiveness is lost by adopting such
privacy focused architecture. As mentioned above, Bluetooth based digital
contact tracing tracks proximity and not geolocation. However, for tracking and
controlling an infectious disease pandemic, location is actually more useful. For
example, if a person reports positive for COVID-19, public health authorities
will want to be able identify everyone who was near them, not just those with
Bluetooth enabled contact tracing on their phones. Knowing that the person
spent time at the local supermarket would allow authorities to post signs at that
store notifying those who regularly shop there to get tested. The emphasis on
privacy also means that not all crucial information will be shared with critical
partners. One European protocol, DT-3P, only allows for health authorities to be
notified if the COVID-19 positive individual chooses to allow it. 25 While not all
countries have adopted this protocol, it is aligned with the Apple/Google
approach. 26
Obviously, this greatly undermines the ability of public health authorities to
adequately respond to the pandemic and utilize all data available. Furthermore,
many digital contact tracing apps rely on individuals to self-report or to give
permission for their health care provider to report their COVID-19 test results.
It is unknown how many individuals may test positive but decline to enter this
information into the system, perhaps due to fears of oppression in the form of a
mandatory quarantine order triggered by reporting this data. This means that the
digital contact tracing system will not be able to be utilized for some percentage
of cases, even though those individuals may have the app installed. This is
problematic because success breeds success. When there were few stories about
COVID-19 digital contact tracing apps resulting in lowered transmission rates,
individuals had little incentive to download these apps or to continue to use
them.
Similarly, another impediment to widespread adoption of digital contact
tracing was likely consumers’ fears about the usage of their data and lack of trust
in the institutions developing the applications. A study in Australia demonstrated
that higher levels of trust in data privacy was strongly predictive of the
probability of downloading the digital contact tracing app available to those

24. Charlotte Jee, Is a Successful Contact Tracing App Possible? These Countries Think So,
MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/08/10/1006174/covid
-contract-tracing-app-germany-ireland-success/ [https://perma.cc/C6R3-A3R9].
25. I. Glenn Cohen et al., Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19: Public Health and
Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 JAMA 2371, 2371 (2020).
26. Id. at 2372.
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individuals. 27 Conversely, lower levels of trust in data privacy are a likely reason
for reluctance to use a digital contact tracing app. In most countries in which
digital contact tracing apps were not made mandatory, the significant levels of
awareness of privacy and personal data concerns—i.e., the lack of trust—meant
that it was a significant challenge to get individuals to actually use these apps. 28
Individuals are wise to be wary and have low levels of trust in data privacy,
at least in some jurisdictions. In the United States there was little to prevent
technology companies from using this valuable data for further purposes,
including commercialization, although there were some attempts to legislate this
issue. 29 In the United States, digital contact tracing apps were unlikely to be
governed by HIPAA unless they involved a covered entity as discussed above. 30
Therefore, it was unclear to individuals how their data would be used beyond
the initial purpose of COVID-19 contact tracing. This could be a significant
contribution to a lack of trust in data privacy. For example, there were fears
during the Black Lives Matter protests that digital contact tracing was going to
be used to identify and punish protestors. 31 By contrast, European users of digital
contact tracing apps are better protected by the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) which governs not only medical data but virtually all data
generated. 32 Despite these additional protections, the limited adoption of digital
contact tracing apps in Europe, fairly comparable to the rates of adoption in the
United States, demonstrates that European users are perhaps similarly skeptical
of these applications.
IV. COVID-19 VACCINATION: THE NEXT INTERSECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
AND PRIVACY
The next collision between public health and privacy will be in the form of
COVID-19 vaccine tracking. As of this writing, the Food and Drug
Administration has granted emergency use authorization for COVID-19
vaccines created by Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson. 33
27. Nicholas Biddle et al., Data Trust and Data Privacy in the COVID- 19 Period, AUSTL.
NAT’L U. 1, 24 (2020), https://csrm.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/2020/7/Data_trust_and
_data_privacy_in_the_COVID-19_period.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GBX-RXCS].
28. Robert A. Fahey & Airo Hino, COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on DataFocused Public Health Responses, 55 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 1, 1 (2020).
29. Carmel Shachar, Protecting Privacy in Digital Contact Tracing For COVID-19: Avoiding
A Regulatory Patchwork, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (May 19, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org
/do/10.1377/hblog20200515.190582/full/ [https://perma.cc/FU6Y-85GK].
30. Id.
31. Fahey & Hino, supra note 28, at 4.
32. Shachar, supra note 29.
33. Colin Dwyer, Moderna’s COVID-19 Vaccine Becomes 2nd to Earn FDA Authorization,
NPR (Dec. 18, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/12/18
/947948227/modernas-covid-19-vaccine-becomes-2nd-to-earn-fda-authorization [https://perma.cc
/LXD6-T475].
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There are several other pharmaceutical companies working to create and obtain
approval for their own COVID-19 vaccines in the US and other jurisdictions,
including a collaborative effort by Oxford University and AstraZeneca 34 and
another developed by Novavax. 35 If 2020 was the year of a global pandemic,
2021 will be the year of mass vaccinations across the globe.
Public health, as expressed both through government initiatives and the
actions of private actors, requires not only individuals to be vaccinated for
COVID-19 but also to be able to track who has been vaccinated and who has not
been. Because COVID-19 is highly infectious, some countries, such as Hungary
and Iceland, may require proof of immunity—either through antibodies or
vaccination—before allowing non-citizens to enter. 36 As vaccination becomes
more commonplace, more and more countries will likely require proof of
COVID-19 immunity for travel. States may require COVID-19 vaccination for
those working with vulnerable populations, such as staff in a nursing facility, or
for university students. Municipalities that rely on public transportation may
require some sort of COVID-19 proof of vaccination before individuals are
permitted to use their buses and trains. Employers may go beyond those limited
mandates, to require COVID-19 vaccination of their employees returning to the
workplace. Restaurants, concert venues, and sports games may also require
proof of vaccination so that they can avoid inadvertently playing host to a superspreader event or even advertise their venues as COVID free. 37
In some ways, requiring COVID-19 vaccination and disclosure of
vaccination status will not be new. Traditionally, states and municipalities have
required proof of vaccinations, or documentation of why exemptions should be
granted, for children attending school. 38 States have also required certain
employers, especially hospitals, to require vaccinations and to track proof of
vaccinations for their employees. Famously, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that states have very broad powers to implement
immunization requirements to protect public health. 39 On the other hand,
COVID-19 vaccination requirements will probably be more far reaching than
34. Maria Deloria Knoll & Chizoba Wonodi, Oxford–AstraZeneca COVID-19 Vaccine
Efficacy, 397 THE LANCET 72, 72 (2020).
35. Paul T. Heath et al., Safety and Efficacy of NVX-CoV2373 Covid-19 Vaccine, NEW ENG.
J. MED. (June 30, 2021), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa2107659?listPDF=true
[https://perma.cc/NPR3-FM97].
36. Scott McLean & Florence Davey-Attee, ‘Immunity Passports’ are Already Here. But They
Come with Warnings, CNN TRAVEL (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/hungaryiceland-covid-immunity-passport-scn/index.html [https://perma.cc/XAV6-JL3R].
37. Jane C. Hu, Now That COVID-19 Vaccines Are Here, So Is the Prospect of Digital
Immunity Passports, SLATE (Dec. 18, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/12/what
-are-covid-19-digital-immunity-passports.html [https://perma.cc/EC3K-3YTJ].
38. Carmel Shachar & Dorit Reiss, When Are Vaccine Mandates Appropriate?, 22 AMA J. OF
ETHICS 36, 37 (2020).
39. 197 U.S. 11, 11–12 (1905).
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most vaccine requirements because of the impact that COVID-19 has had on
society. Many vaccine requirements are limited to children attending school,
which would allow adults to continue to live and work in these communities
even if they did not agree with the vaccine mandate. The unprecedented reach
of the COVID-19 vaccination efforts will likely give rise to litigation and policy
debates.
2021 will also be a year of conflict between individuals’ interest in keeping
their vaccination histories private and public health efforts to track vaccination
efforts. A significant percentage of Americans have indicated that they do not
want to receive the COVID-19 vaccine, according to polling conducted both by
the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Pew Research Center. 40 The number of
vaccine skeptics and those reluctant increases in communities of color, which
may be the result of a complicated history with the medical establishment. 41
Individuals may resent having to disclose their vaccination status in order to use
public transportation, shop in person, go to their offices, and live their daily
lives. They may also worry how this data will be used for purposes beyond
immediate access.
Furthermore, the architecture of vaccine tracking is unclear: currently the
Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) provides COVID-19 vaccination cards
that are meant to be a reminder to patients to get their second dose and not proof
of vaccination. 42 Health care providers can provide vaccination records, just as
they do with other vaccines, but this may be complicated by the fact that many
individuals will be receiving their COVID-19 vaccines through their
workplaces, local pharmacies, or other alternative providers. Technology
companies and industry sponsors are working to fill this void, with airlines
laying the groundwork to use CommonPass, currently an app used to show that
users have tested negative, for vaccine verification purposes. 43 The parallels to
digital contact tracing are striking: industry leadership resulting in a potentially
fragmented market and with questionable data privacy protections.

40. Liz Hamel et al., Race, Health, and COVID-19: The Views and Experiences of Black
Americans, KFF 1, 4 (Oct. 13, 2020), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Race-Health-andCOVID-19-The-Views-and-Experiences-of-Black-Americans.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JPC-D56Z];
Cary Funk & Alec Tyson, Intent to Get a COVID-19 Vaccine Rises to 60% as Confidence in
Research and Development Process Increases, PEW RES. CTR. 1, 4 (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2020/12/PS_2020.12.03
_covid19-vaccine-intent_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL84-FFTT].
41. Hamel et al., supra note 40.
42. Akshay Syal, Covid Vaccine Cards are a Reminder for the Second Shot, Not a Passport,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2020, 8:49 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/covid-vac
cine-cards-are-reminder-2nd-shot-not-passport-n1249941 [https://perma.cc/8ECH-6FMW].
43. Hu, supra note 37.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

BALANCING PUBLIC HEALTH AND PRIVACY

847

V. LESSONS TO LEARN FOR COVID-19 VACCINE TRACKING
It is vitally important that we learn from the failure of digital contact tracing
when implementing COVID-19 vaccine verification tracking. Otherwise, we run
the risk of botching the implementation of a valuable tool in combating the
COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, we should use this opportunity to consider
the historical shortcomings of the American data privacy regulation scheme
when it comes to novel uses of technology in public health.
Foremost, we should consider the importance that trust plays in the adoption
of digital solutions to public health concerns. The digital contact tracing efforts
incorporated privacy-preserving efforts into the digital architecture, in the form
of Bluetooth technology. This was a good step, allowing developers to tout that
their apps could not gather certain sensitive information, such as geolocation
data. Nevertheless, this choice in and of itself was probably not sufficient to
resolve the tension between public health and individual privacy interests. The
fragmentation of the digital contact tracing market and the leadership from
companies that are unregulated by HIPAA, such as technology companies,
likely did not inspire confidence from users. Simply telling consumers that
technology companies have pledged to respect privacy is not enough. It is
extremely important that institutions that require the use of COVID-19 vaccine
verification trackers, be they government entities such as transportation
authorities or private companies such as concert halls, be transparent in way that
this data may or may not be used. As these verification trackers are developed
there should be an opportunity for community representatives to provide
feedback so that these apps reflect the local privacy expectations and norms.
Another take away may be that success helps foster confidence and
adoption. Digital contact tracing apps based on Bluetooth had some serious
limitations, such as requiring the individual to voluntarily enter COVID-19 test
results. Because of these limitations, the apps were always going to be of
somewhat limited use to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Without any success
stories of note, there was little to inspire individuals to download these apps and
use them. There are parallels to the response to vaccination requirements: in
scenarios where authorities over relied on mandates there was significant
pushback, including riots at times. 44 Vaccine campaigns were more successful
when mandates were accompanied by educational efforts, to help individuals
understand why participating in this public health initiative was beneficial to
them. If there had been more education and outreach regarding digital contact
tracing apps, then perhaps adoption rates would have increased. This would have
resulted in more chains of transmission being broken, creating a feedback loop
of success. Governments should consider educational campaigns to help

44. Shachar & Reiss, supra note 38, at 40.
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individuals understand why verifying COVID-19 vaccination status before
entering public spaces is so important.
Lastly, because of the importance of tracking both COVID-19 infections and
vaccinations, the United States should consider data privacy legislation targeted
at digital solutions to these public health problems. HIPAA is too limited to
reach digital contact tracing apps and vaccine verifications trackers because it
focuses on traditional medical providers. Passing targeted legislation focused on
building trust among individual users of these digital solutions would help
significantly with adoption of vaccine verification trackers. Individuals could be
assured that their data would really only be used for certain uses. This may even
allow us to structure these digital solutions to maximize their effectiveness rather
than to maximize privacy protections.
The tension between public health initiatives and privacy interests is a
longstanding one, as demonstrated by the challenges that HIPAA has in both
being over and under-protective of privacy when it comes to public health
activities. Nevertheless, digital contact tracing has shown us that the tension
between public health and privacy can significantly undermine important digital
solutions that can address infectious disease pandemics. There is now a
significant chance that the same tension will undermine our ability to track
COVID-19 vaccination efforts. In order to avoid the same mistakes as digital
contact tracing, we should be careful to foster trust, through education, through
incorporation of community norms, and through targeted legislation.

